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I. INTRODUCTION
In Italy, the Gelli-Bianco Law (referred to as the 2017 Law in
this article) 1 deals with the issue of medical malpractice, liability of
the healthcare provider and, from a broader perspective, defensive
medicine. 2 The previous law (commonly referred to as the Balduzzi
∗ Assistant Professor, University of Bologna School of Law; LL.M., Louisiana State University; Doctorate in Comparative Law, University of Milan.
1. Legge Mar. 8, 2017, n. 24, G.U. Mar. 17, 2017, n. 64. It is commonly
referred to as the Gelli-Bianco Law due to the name of the two members of the
Parliament who submitted the relevant text.
2. Defensive medicine occurs when physicians order unnecessary treatments and excessively rely on tests and procedures (i.e., positive defensive medicine), or when they refuse to treat patients that present a high degree of risk, in an
effort to avoid malpractice suits rather than because they consider the treatment
medically appropriate (i.e., negative defensive medicine). See U.S. Congress, Office of Technological Assessment, Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice
3, OTA-H--602 (1994), quoted by Sira Grosso, What Is Reasonable and What
Can Be Proved as Reasonable: Reflections on the Role of Evidence-Based Medicine and Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Negligence Claims, 27 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 74, 76 n. 13 (2018); see also Daniel W. Shuman, Expertise in Law,
Medicine and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 268 (2001).
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Law 3) was enacted in 2012 and represented the first legislative attempt to put a limit to professional liability grounded on medical
malpractice in light of the settled judicial orientation of the previous
case law. 4 Indeed, until 2012, without a specific legal framework for
medical malpractice, Italian judges and Italian doctrine addressed
the issue. 5
3. Decreto Legge Sept. 13, 2012, n. 158, G.U. Sept. 13, 2012, n. 214 converted with amendments in Legge Nov. 8, 2012, n. 189, G.U. Nov. 10, 2012, n.
263 (“Urgent provisions to foster the development of the Country through a higher
level of health’s protection”).
4. See generally Giulio Ponzanelli, La responsabilità medica: dal primato
della giurisprudenza alla disciplina legislativa, 8-9 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ
819 (2016).
5. Pursuant to the Italian case-law, medical malpractice used to be encompassed within the range of application of art. 2043 of the Italian Civil Code
(“C.c.”). Art. 2043 C.c. (Compensation for unlawful acts) provides the general
norm for tort liability. However, starting from 1999, the Italian Supreme Court
(with ruling n. 589/1999), through the recourse to the fictio iuris of the so called
contatto sociale between the physician and the patient, deemed such liability as a
contractual one, thus applying the relevant legal regime, more favorable to the
patient. On behalf of the healthcare provider, it used to be invoked the application
of art. 2236 C.c., limiting the liability of the practitioner to the event of her malice
or gross negligence, but only for cases requiring the solution of technical issues
of particular difficulty. See, ex multis, Guido Alpa, Ars interpretandi e
responsabilità sanitaria a seguito della nuova legge Bianco-Gelli, 3 CONTRATO
E IMPRESA 728, 732 (2017) [hereinafter Alpa, Ars interpretandi]. Besides the liability of the physician, it used to be affirmed that the contractual liability of the
healthcare institution (public and/or private) due to the atypical contract (i.e., contratto di spedalità), expressly or implicitly entered into force between the patient
and the institution. In light of its peculiarities, the medical malpractice used to be
deemed by some commentators and tribunals as a sub-system of civil liability.
See, ex multis, Carlo Granelli, Il fenomeno della medicina difensiva e la legge di
riforma della responsabilità sanitaria, 2 RESP. CIV. PREV. 410, nn.120-131
(2018); RAFFAELLA DE MATTEIS, LA RESPONSABILITÀ MEDICA: UN
SOTTOSISTEMA DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE (CEDAM Padova, 1995);
Vincenzo Roppo, La responsabilità civile dell’impresa nel settore dei servizi
innovativi, CONTRATO E IMPRESA 891, 894 (1993). According to other scholars,
though speaking of “system” would raise conceptual issues, medical malpractice
should nevertheless be intended as a special regime comparable to that of tort
liability; see Guido Alpa, From the Physician to the Team, to the Healthcare Setting, to the System, in LAW AND MEDICINE—CURRENT TOPICS IN A GERMAN AND
ITALIAN PERSPECTIVE 13, 14 (Consiglia Botta & Christian Armbrüster eds.,
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2017). The 2017 Law has introduced specific provisions dealing with the proper qualification of medical malpractice: see infra, §
III. For interesting remarks about individual liability and the evolution of the law
of torts, see Olivier Moréteau, Individual Liability in a Vulnerable Environment:
Revisiting the Ethical Foundations of Tort Law, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAAP
SPIER 239-257 (Helmut Koziol & Ulrich Magnus eds., Jan Sramek Verlag 2016).
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The legislative intervention reveals the constant interest for the
subject matter as well as the difficulties to cope with its related issues. Like the previous legislation, the 2017 Law addresses the topic
from a wide perspective, insofar as it does not focus only on medical
malpractice, but rather on liability of healthcare providers in general, and it outlines a comprehensive system aimed at achieving the
safety of healthcare through different interventions. Furthermore, it
approaches medical malpractice encompassing new criteria. In particular, the law tries to allocate the liability regime from a legal and
economic perspective, though charging the economic consequences
of an adverse event on the entity better able to bear it (i.e., the public
or private healthcare institution).
Last but not least, in the original intention of the legislature, the
2017 Law was to reduce defensive medicine, 6 thus benefiting patients. In particular, the 2017 Law intended to address the topics of
medical malpractice, defensive medicine and safety of patients introducing a more favorable regime of professional liability for the
healthcare providers, both from the civil law and the criminal law
perspective, focused on a new and more detailed role for Clinical
Practice Guidelines (CPGs). 7
In its original intention, it should have redressed some gaps and
limits of the Balduzzi Law on the one hand, and, it should have decreased defensive medicine and healthcare liability on the other
hand, by providing judges with clearer and more favorable rules and
standard of behavior for healthcare professionals. In spite of several
positive aspects, the 2017 Law did not reach its ambitious goal, in
particular because of the limits of the new regime for criminal liability. 8 The legislative choice to give CPGs a determinant role in the
6. See generally Carlo Granelli, La medicina difensiva in Italia, 1 RESP. CIV.
PREV. 22 (2016); ADELMO MANNA, MEDICINA DIFENSIVA E DIRITTO PENALE. TRA
LEGALITÀ E DIRITTO ALLA SALUTE (Pisa U. Press 2014); ALESSANDRO ROIATI,
MEDICINA DIFENSIVA E COLPA PROFESSIONALE MEDICA IN DIRITTO PENALE. TRA
TEORIA E PRASSI GIURISPRUDENZIALE (Giuffrè 2012).
7. See Alpa, Ars interpretandi, supra note 5, at 729-731.
8. See infra, § V.
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professional liability of healthcare providers’ cases seems to follow
the U.S. legal system, where the topic of Evidence-Based Medicine 9
and that of CPGs originated and have gained primary importance
even for purposes of legislative reforms.
CPGs are commonly associated to Evidence Based Medicine
(EBM). However, many commentators stress the conceptual difference between them, highlighting that EBM involves much more
than CPGs. Yet the latter, when really evidence-based, can facilitate
the practice of EBM by serving as codifications of the best evidence
available. Thus, CPGs are useful, if not essential components of
EBM. 10
In the U.S., the legal system for medical liability is based on the
negligence standard. 11 Currently, neither law nor jurisprudence
9. The first to use the term Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) has been Gordon Guyatt, Evidence-Based Medicine, 114 ACP J. CLUB A16 (1991) (pointing
out the trend towards the best use of scientific literature and biomedical development in medical decision-making). See also David Sackett, Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 71 (1996) (defining EBM
as “the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients”); Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical
Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373 (2002); Roger Sur & Philip Dahm, History of
Evidence-Based Medicine, 27 INDIAN J. UROL. 487 (2011).
10. For the features of the tort of negligence and the relevance of the requirement of the duty of care, see Carter L. Williams, Evidence-Based Medicine in the
Law Beyond Clinical Practice Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on the
Standard of Care?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 479, 486-487 (2004) [hereinafter
Williams, Evidence-Based Medicine]. CPGs used to be defined by the Institute of
Medicine as “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient decision about the appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances,” see Committee on Clinical Practice Guidelines, Institute of Medicine,
Guidelines for Medical Practice 2 (Marylin J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds.
1992). Currently, their revised definition reads: “statements that include recommendations intended to optimize patient care that are informed by a systematic
review of evidence and in assessment of the benefits and harms of alternative care
options.” See Institute of Medicine (U.S.) Committee on Standards for Developing Trustworthy Clinical Practice Guidelines, Clinical Practice Guidelines We
Can Trust (Robin Graham, Michelle Mancher, Dianne Miller Wolman, Sheldon
Greenfield, & Earl Steinberg eds., National Academies Press 2011) [hereinafter
Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust]. As it can be inferred by a comparison
between the two definitions, the latest puts more emphasis on the methodology in
the process of CPGs’ selection.
11. See Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 (Scot.); Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); and MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)).
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clearly and uniformly define the standard of care for claims of medical malpractice. Traditionally, the so called “customary standard”
(i.e., what is usually done in a specific field) used to be adopted.
However, with development of EBM, nowadays there has been a
shift towards a more objective and scientifically grounded standard. 12 Many commentators struggled with the role of CPGs, in particular whether they might be intended as a legal standard of care to
be applied by courts in medical malpractice suits, or whether they
might be used as evidence of the standard of care. In spite of the
increasing role gained by CPGs, a review of the literature about their
legal effects reveals how they so far cannot be intended as a binding
standard of care in light of many criticalities surrounding the CPGs’
phenomenon (e.g., the issue of conflict of interests among different
stakeholders, the issue of reliability, trustworthiness, and accountability of CPGs, the gap between the theoretical perspective of CPGs
and the peculiarities of each patient, the difficulty to cope with patients affected by several diseases, and the risks of the so called
“cookbook medicine”). Accordingly, the topic of EBM and CPGs,
as related to that of medical malpractice and defensive medicine, has
been extensively investigated and argued in U.S. doctrine. 13
12. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), setting forth a standard according to which an expert’s theory is reliable if it meets
four requirements: 1) it is possible to test the theory; 2) it was submitted to peer
review and publication; 3) it points out the potential rate of error; 4) it is generally
accepted by the scientific community.
13. Among the manifold contributions, see Grosso, supra note 2 (focusing on
the issues related to EBM, CPGs and the standard of care within medical practice,
contending that the postulated link between an uncertain legal standard and defensive medicine may be overstated, and that promoting a cultural shift in the
doctor-patient relationship would be more effective in reducing the defensive
medicine trend); Ronen Avraham, Overlooked and Underused: Clinical Practice
Guidelines and Malpractice Liability for Independent Physicians, 20 CONN. INS.
L. J. 273 (2013-2014) (deeming that the use of CPGs may improve the quality of
healthcare in the U.S., analyzing three accountability models—public, private and
semi-public—for CPGs, and arguing in favor of a private competitive regime for
CPGs); Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 543
(2011) (arguing in favor of a private regulation regime (PRR) under which private
firms would develop and update CPGs and they would compete to license their
own CPGs to medical providers, being liable for putting forth sub-optimal guidelines); Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Warped Incentives in
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the U.S. Health Care System, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 7 (2011); Maxwell J. Mehlman,
Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 44 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1165
(2012) (outlining the historical evolution of medical practice and its legal implications, with particular regard to the standard of care, and reporting the most important legislative attempts to introduce legal defenses on behalf of practitioners,
such as that of Maine, Vermont, Florida and Minnesota); Maxwell J. Mehlman,
Medical Malpractice Guidelines as Malpractice Safe Harbors: Illusion or Deceit?, 40 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 286 (2012); Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical
Practice Guidelines in Healthcare Reform: An Update, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 21
(2012) (pointing out that EBM is an essential part of the nation's healthcare reform
strategy and the role of CPGs to implement it; highlighting some key developments and issues in the CPGs movement, and focusing on the activity of the IOM
(Institute of Medicine) to develop trustworthy and reliable CPGs); John Tucker,
A Novel Approach to Determine Best Medical Practices: Looking at the Evidence,
10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 147 (2009); Michelle H. Lewis et al., The Locality Rule and the Physician’s Dilemma: Local medical Practices and the National
Standard of Care, 297 JAMA 2633 (2007) (pointing out that the applicable standard of care in medical malpractice lawsuits varies among jurisdictions in the U. S.
and arguing that the locality rule is difficult to justify, as medical education has
become more standardized and modern technology provides rural physicians with
the same access to information for patient care as urban ones); James F. Blumstein, Medical Malpractice Standard-Setting: Developing Malpractice “Safe Harbors” as a New Role for Q10s?, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1017 (2006) (focusing on determination of liability for medical malpractice purposes through the modification
of the standard adopted in targeted areas); Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer
Review Standards and Due Process: Moving From Tort Doctrine Toward Contract Principles Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.
1179 (2006) (describing the doctrines applicable to medical malpractice and focusing on the role of CPGs); James Ducharme, Clinical Guidelines and Policies:
Can They Improve Emergency Department Pain Management?, 33 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 783 (2005) (reporting the definitions of relevant tools for medical practice, such as protocols, practice guidelines, clinical pathways, etc.); Williams, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 10 (emphasizing how some courts affirmed
the physician’s “duty to stay abreast” with the latest medical science, stressing the
difference between EBM and CPGs, and contending to bifurcate the standard of
care for medical practice in substantial and procedural one); Michelle M. Mello,
Using Statistical Evidence to Prove the Malpractice Standard of Care: Bridging
Legal, Clinical and Statistical Thinking, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 821 (2002)
(arguing that attempting to integrate clinical practice guidelines into malpractice
litigation suggests that practical and conceptual problems involved in merging the
cultures of medicine, science, and law should not be underestimated); Michelle
M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645 (2001) [hereinafter
Mello, Of Swords and Shields] (developing a seminal analysis about the role of
CPGs, the main features of medical malpractice litigation, the legislative attempts
to provide healthcare professionals with a shield to defend themselves from alleged professional liability, and contending that CPGs cannot be deemed as a legal
standard of care); Elise C. Becher & Mark Chassin, Improving the Quality of
Health Care: Who Will Lead?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 164 (2001) (defining quality
problems of CPGs as underuse, overuse and misuse); Arnold J Rosoff, EvidenceBased Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines,
26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L., 327 (2001); Arnold J Rosoff, The Role of Clinical
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The approach adopted by the Italian lawmaker also follows the
path devised by the European institutions. According to the EU approach, although this area of law pertains to the competence of the
Member States, 14 it is important to set an EU common level of health
protection through, among other means, the development of the recourse to CPGs. 15
The new system depicted by the 2017 Law has, thus, been enriched with further provisions dealing with different aspects of the
healthcare field, aimed at pursuing the same target. For example, the
law sets thresholds for the amount of damage to be compensated by
the physician on behalf of public hospitals or other public healthcare
entities in the event of liability of the hospital due to the gross negligence of the physician (art. 9). 16 Article 12 also requires that
Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 369 (1995) (proposing a system that would grant the Federal Government the task not to develop
guidelines, but rather to certify privately developed CPGs); Angela Campbell &
Kathleen Cranley Grass, The Legal Status of Clinical and Ethics Policies, Codes,
and Guidelines in Medical Practice and Research, 46 MCGILL L. J. 473 (2001)
(arguing about the role of professional norm and/or legal norm of CPGs); Michael
Cabana et al., Why Don’t Physicians Follow Clinical Practice Guidelines?
Framework for Improvement, 282 JAMA 1458 (1999); Barry R. Furrow, Broadcasting Clinical Guidelines on the Internet: Will Physicians Tune In?, 25 AM. J.
L. & MED. 403 (1999) (arguing on behalf of CPGs and providing an overview of
the main on-line (at that time) available CPGs’ databases); William R. Trail &
Brad A. Allen, Government Created Medical Practice Guidelines: The Opening
of Pandora’s Box, 10 J. L. & HEALTH 231 (1995-1996) (analyzing four basic types
of government created medical practice guidelines and arguing that the first
type—i.e., State created affirmative defense—would be the optimal practice
guidelines program); Daniel Jutras, Clinical Practice Guidelines as Legal Norms,
148 CANAD. MED. J. ASSOC. 905 (1993) (focusing on the potential liability resulting from the drafting and implementation of CPGs); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBL. 87 (1991); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: The Policy Rationale, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 777 (1990).
14. For an overview of the different national legal systems within the European Union, see EWOUD HONDIUS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL LIABILITY
(Ewoud Hondius ed., Cambridge U. Press 2010); MEDICAL LIABILITY IN EUROPE:
A COMPARISON OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS (Bernard A. Koch ed., De Gruyter
2011).
15. See, e.g., Athanasios Panagiotou, Professional Standards, Clinical
Guidelines and Medical Liability: A Chance for Significant Improvement in Determining the Standard of Care?, 25 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 157 (2018).
16. See generally Giulio Ponzanelli, Medical Malpractice: La Legge Bianco
Gelli. Una Premessa, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 268 (2017).
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healthcare institutions 17 have mandatory insurance-coverage; thus,
trying to limit the practice, common in recent years, of self-insured
retention (S.I.R.). Furthermore, art. 10, § 6 of the law allows victims
of alleged medical malpractice to directly sue the insurance company of the healthcare institution and/or the healthcare provider implementing a special fund for damages arising from medical malpractice. 18 Additionally, art. 8 of the 2017 Law imposes a mediation
proceeding as a mandatory pre-requirement to file a malpractice
suit. 19
This contribution will specifically focus on the new regime of
the healthcare provider’s liability and on the key role played by
CPGs. In particular, section II will briefly explain the previous legal
regime and the relevant judicial orientation based on settled case
law; section III will address the main features of the 2017 Law; section IV will deal with the case law developed after the enactment of
the 2017 Law; and section V will focus on the topic of the patient’s
informed consent. Then, final remarks will be expressed.
II. THE BALDUZZI LAW
The Balduzzi Law was the first legislative attempt to provide for
medical malpractice in order to limit the phenomenon of defensive
medicine, with specific provisions in terms of both civil and
criminal liability to be applied to healthcare professionals in general.
In spite of its laconic and incomplete text,20 the Balduzzi Law was

17. See, e.g., Leonardo Bugiolacchi, Le strutture sanitarie e l’assicurazione
per la R.C. verso terzi: natura e funzione dell’assicurazione obbligatoria nella
legge n. 24/2017 (Legge “Gelli/Bianco”), 3 RESP. CIV. PREV. 133 (2017).
18. See Maurizio Hazan, L’azione diretta nell’assicurazione obbligatoria
della RC sanitaria (e il regime delle eccezioni), 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 317
(2017).
19. See generally Rosanna Breda, La responsabilità civile delle strutture
sanitarie e del medico tra conferme e novità, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 283,
286 (2017).
20. Terms adopted by the Supreme Court of Cassation, see Cass., sez. IV
penale, Apr. 9, 2013, n. 16237, § 4 [hereinafter Cantore].
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significant under two different aspects. 21 For the first time, it
introduced the distinction between slight and gross negligence 22 for
the affirmation or exclusion of criminal liability. Secondly, the
Balduzzi Law also enhanced the role of CPGs. In addition, it
represented the outcome of a debate arisen from a heterogeneous
context: the defensive needs of healthcare providers, victim
expectations, the issues of properly allocating healthcare costs, the
balance between therapeutic necessities, and the limits of public
financial resources.
The keystone of the law was its art. 3:
The healthcare provider who, in the execution of her performance complies with clinical guidelines and good clinical
customs accredited by the scientific community, is not criminally liable for slight negligence. 23 In these cases, the obligation arising from art. 2043 C.c. [Civil Code] is maintained.
In determining the compensation of the damage, the judge
shall duly consider the behavior set forth in the first paragraph.
The text has raised many issues about its meaning and range of application. A concern dealt also with the alleged unconstitutionality

21. See, e.g., Ombretta Di Giovine, In Difesa del c.d. Decreto Balduzzi
(Ovvero: Perché Non È Possibile Ragionare di Medicina Come Se Fosse Diritto
e di Diritto Come Se Fosse Matematica)?, 1 ARCH. PEN. 3 (2014).
22. For an interesting comparative analysis about fault liability and for the
relevant terminology, see Gert Brüggemeier, Fault Liability Today. A Critical
View of the Cathedral, 1 OPINIO JURIS COMPARATIONE 1 (2014), available at
https://perma.cc/CWF6-X9HA.
23. Pursuant to the Italian Penal Code (“C.p.”), art. 43—Mental Element of
the Offenses—a crime shall be 1) intentional, i.e., according to intention, when
the harmful or dangerous event, which is the result of the act or omission, and on
which the existence of the crime depends, is foreseen and desired by the actor as
a consequence of his own act or omission; shall be 2) preterintentional, i.e., in
excess of intention, when the act or omission is followed by a harmful or dangerous event more serious than that desired by the actor; shall be 3) negligent, i.e.,
contrary to intention, when the event, even though foreseen, is not desired by the
actor and occurs because of carelessness, imprudence, unskillfulness or failure to
observe laws, regulations, orders or protocols. As for negligence, the first kind
(i.e., carelessness, imprudence, unskillfulness) is named “generic negligence,”
while the second (failure to observe laws, regulations, orders or protocols) is
named “specific negligence.”
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of this provision in light of art. 3 of the Italian Constitution (affirming the principle of equality24) due to the more favorable regime for
healthcare providers in comparison with other socially relevant professions, equally complex and potentially risky. 25
Most notably, for the first time, the Balduzzi Law introduced the
distinction between slight and gross criminal negligence. Until then,
art. 133 of the Criminal Code was used, among other criteria, to determine quam in concreto the extent of the criminal sanction.
Through the Balduzzi Law, criteria are used to affirm or deny the
criminal liability of the healthcare provider. Therefore, under this
regime, the distinction became the “turning point” between liability
and no liability.
The first obstacle arose from the fact that the Balduzzi Law did
not explain the difference between the two categories of negligence.
Thus, the courts were left with the task to conceptually identify and
distinguish between them, in particular in the borderline cases. 26
Therefore, it has been up to judicial interpretation to clarify the
range of application of the Balduzzi Law provisions. In particular,
the Supreme Court stressed that the judicial history of medical malpractice is the topos for the study of professional negligence, especially when dealing with gross negligence. 27
24. Art. 3, para. 1 Costituzione: “All citizens have equal social dignity and
are equal in front of the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion,
political opinion, personal and social conditions.”
25. See Trib. Milano, sez. IX penale, ordinanza Mar. 21, 2013 and comment
by Marco Scoletta, Rispetto delle linee guida e non punibilità della colpa lieve
dell’operatore sanitario: la “norma penale di favore” al giudizio della Corte
costituzionale, ibidem, DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO, Mar. 29, 2013,
available at https://perma.cc/8U68-Y3SU. However, the recourse has been rejected by the Constitutional Court, holding that the ordinance a quo did not
properly described the issue and lacked an adequate reasoning supporting the importance of the request. Corte Cost., ord. Dec. 6, 2013, n. 295, available at
https://perma.cc/MRL6-5ZX2.
26. See, e.g., Domenico Pulitanò, Responsabilità medica: letture e valutazioni divergenti del novum legislativo, 4 DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO 73
(2013) (proposing the distinction between imperfect performances (subject to
punishment only in cases of gross negligence) and perfect non-performances, occurring in case of clear non-compliance with the CPGs and subject to punishment).
27. See Cantore, supra note 20, § 5.
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In this regard, the evolution can be divided into three different
periods. During the first period, from the enactment of the Civil
Code until the 1980s, the courts tended to adopt a very favorable
approach for the physicians, and their liability used to be affirmed
only in very outrageous cases due to the “macroscopic” violation of
the most elementary rules of the ars medica. Pursuant to this view,
the exclusion of liability used to be the rule, whereas its affirmation
used to be the exception. The normative ground of this approach is
identified in art. 2236 C.c., 28 which was interpreted as requiring the
affirmation of liability only in very strict cases of macroscopic mistake. In particular, the application of art. 2236 C.c. to the criminal
area used to be justified on the basis of the inner consistency of the
legal system as a whole. However, it must be noted that, under this
perspective, it is up to the physician to prove the occurrence of peculiar technical difficulties and the release from liability applies
only to cases of unskillfulness, not to carelessness or imprudence. 29
The concern about the constitutional compliance of this approach with the principle of equality set forth in art. 3 of the Italian
Constitution was addressed by the Constitutional Court in 1973. 30
The Court found that the interpretation above complies with the Italian Constitution since arts. 589, 42, 43 C.p. and art. 2236 C.c. give
rise to a peculiar legal regime for intellectual professionals (like
physicians, lawyers, engineers, etc.) aimed at facing two opposite
purposes: on one side, not to mortify the initiative of the professional
with the fear of unfair retaliation in the event of her failure and, on
the other, not to indulge on behalf of the inconsiderate decision or

28. Art. 2236 C.c., Liability of the performer of a work: “If the performance
implies the solution of technical issues of particular difficulty, the performer is
not liable for damages unless in the event of her malice or gross negligence.”
29. See Cantore, supra note 20, § 5. See ALBERTO CRESPI, LA
RESPONSABILITÀ PENALE NEL TRATTAMENTO MEDICO-CHIRURGICO CON ESITO
INFAUSTO (Priulla 1955); Alberto Crespi, I recenti orientamenti giurisprudenziali
nell’accertamento della colpa professionale del medico chirurgo: evoluzione o
involuzione?, 4 RIV. IT. MED. LEG. 785, 789 (1992).
30. Corte Cost., sentenza Nov. 28, 1973, n. 166, available at https://perma
.cc/MRL6-5ZX2.
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reprehensible omissions of the professional. However, this regime
shall apply only in cases of particular technical difficulties and only
when unskillfulness is at stake. 31
During the second period, from the 1980s to 2007, a new approach was favored, based on the relational nature of the patientprofessional link: the uniform judicial orientation was aimed at protecting the patient’s health, thus increasing the range of liability of
the physician. Consequently, the special regime of art. 2236 C.c.
was neglected for the purposes of criminal law, on the assumption
that civil law and criminal law are different domains. 32
Finally, as of the third period, starting from 2007, 33 it has been
deemed that, although art. 2236 C.c. cannot be directly applied to
criminal law, its ratio can operate as rule of experience to be taken
into account by the judge when assessing the behavior of the professional in event of emergencies, or when the case implies the solution
of particularly complex issues. Consequently, art. 2236 C.c. stands
for the codification of an inner logical and empirical rule, underlying
the whole legal system. 34
As above mentioned, through the Balduzzi Law, the Italian lawmaker intended to outline a legal framework to provide for a topic
so far exclusively governed by judicial precedents: in particular, the
Balduzzi Law clarifies the nature of (and the requirements for) professional liability of the healthcare providers in general, and fosters
the role of CPGs to guide the professional’s behavior. 35

31. Id.
32. See Cantore, supra note 20, § 6. See Fabio Basile, Un itinerario
giurisprudenziale sulla responsabilità medica colposa tra art. 2236 Cod. Civ. e
Legge Balduzzi (aspettando la riforma della riforma), 2 DIRITTO PENALE
CONTEMPORANEO 159 (2017).
33. Cass. Sez. IV penale June 21, 2007, n. 39592.
34. See, e.g., Cass., sez. IV penale, Apr. 5, 2011, n. 16328 (“Montalto”); see
also Cass., sez. IV penale, Nov. 22, 2011, n. 4391 (“Di Lella”).
35. For interesting remarks about the relationship between CPGs and the
healthcare professional’s behavior, see ANDREA R. DI LANDRO, DALLE LINEE
GUIDA E DAI PROTOCOLLI ALL’INDIVIDUALIZZAZIONE DELLA COLPA PENALE NEL
SETTORE SANITARIO. MISURA OGGETTIVA E SOGGETTIVA DELLA “MALPRACTICE”
(Giappichelli 2012).
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However, despite the determinant role granted to CPGs and
good clinical practices, it failed to properly define and identify them,
thus leaving room to practical uncertainties and allowing strategic
defenses like the reference to the so-called posthumous (search for)
guidelines. This phenomenon occurs when a physician charged with
a malpractice claim points out, on an ex-post basis, a guideline as a
justification of her previous behavior. 36 The generic reference of art.
3 to improperly qualified guidelines allowed the professional to
avoid liability by referring to guidelines not necessarily known, or
not specifically taken into account, by her at the moment of the decision-making process and that of performance.
The Balduzzi Law also failed to provide a criterion to select,
among the manifold available guidelines, those grounded on scientific evidence and therefore reliable, making only a generic reference to guidelines “accredited by the scientific community.” 37 An
additional concern dealt with the proper identification of the range
of application of the waiver of criminal liability set forth by art. 3. 38
In particular, it was controversial whether this rule ought to be applied to all types of negligence (i.e., carelessness, imprudence, and
unskillfulness) or to the sole cases of unskillful behavior. 39 Indeed,
in spite of some diverging opinions, the Supreme Court has eventually excluded the criminal liability of the healthcare provider in all
cases of slight criminal negligence, regardless of the nature of negligence (thus, either in cases of carelessness, imprudence, or unskill-

36. Paolo Piras, Il discreto invito della giurisprudenza a fare noi la riforma
della colpa medica, DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO, July 4, 2017, § 7,
available at https://perma.cc/52N8-CGTQ.
37. The same concern about reliability and trustworthiness of CPGs has been
expressed and extensively investigated within the U.S. scenario, see Mello, Of
Swords and Shields, supra note 13, at 650-652. Eventually, the IOM has particularly focused its attention on such issue as can be inferred by the latest definition
of CPGs, see Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust supra note 10.
38. See art. 3 of Balduzzi Law cited in text above note 23.
39. See Brüggemeier, supra note 22.
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ful behavior) and, in so doing, has resolved the controversial conceptual issue to distinguish among the three types of fault, while at
the same time preserving equal treatment among professionals. 40
In brief, on one side, thanks to the dialogue between the legislative and judicial formants, 41 the conceptual achievements in malpractice, except for some unsolved issues, were quite noteworthy. 42
However, on the other side, the phenomenon of defensive medicine
had increased. 43 One of the main unsolved issues dealt with the nature of medical liability. Indeed, in spite of the clear and straightforward legislative provision regarding the nature of medical liability
(i.e., tort liability), Italian courts used to affirm constantly its contractual nature, with all the legal consequences this entails regarding
the burden of proof and prescription or the statute of limitation. 44
This, inter alia, has been pointed out among the factors determining
the increase of the phenomenon of defensive medicine.
The aim of the 2017 Law, at least in the beginning, was to clear
up those critical elements, for example the role of CPGs and their
proper identification. However, the final outcome seems so far to

40. Cass., sez. IV penale, June 6, 2016, n. 23283 [hereinafter Denegri]; Cass.,
sez. IV penale, July 1, 2015, n. 45527 (“Cerracchio”); Cass., sez. IV penale, Oct.
9, 2014, n. 47289 (“Stefanetti”).
41. From the comparative-law perspective, “legal formants” are those elements concurring to characterize a particular legal system and which must be
taken into account to have a proper knowledge of it: paradigmatic examples of
legal formants are, in addition to legislative provisions, court rulings, academic
writing, professional and administrative practice developed in a particular context.
See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law,
39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 and 343 (1991).
42. See Cantore, supra note 20 and Denegri, supra note 40.
43. See Carlo Brusco, Informazioni statistiche sulla giurisprudenza penale di
legittimità in tema di responsabilità medica, DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO,
July 14, 2016, available at https://perma.cc/H7QA-KVAX; Nicola Enrichens, Le
linee guida tra medici, pazienti e diritto: alcune osservazioni, RIV. RESP. MEDICA,
Mar. 13, 2018, available at https://perma.cc/Y9BW-H6S8. For further statistical
data, see also Federico Valentini, Il nuovo assetto della responsabilità sanitaria
dopo la riforma Gelli-Bianco, 4 RIV. IT. MED. LEG. 1395 (2017).
44. A further distinction between the two regimes, in transnational cases,
deals with the criteria to identify the governing law (i.e., pursuant to EU Rome I
Regulation for contractual obligations and EU Rome II Regulation for non-contractual obligations) and the forum (i.e., EU Brussels I bis Regulation).
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have missed the point and, while the 2017 Law has certainly provided a contribution to the proper identification of relevant CPGs, it
seems to have moved backward in comparison to the Balduzzi Law,
at least from the criminal liability perspective.
III. THE 2017 LAW
The 2017 Law, entitled “Disposizioni in materia di sicurezza
delle cure e della persona assistita, nonché in materia di responsabilità professionale degli esercenti le professioni sanitarie”
[Provisions on safety of the healthcare and of the patient, as well as
on professional liability of the healthcare providers], addresses, as
the heading reveals, different aspects of the healthcare world, encompassing provisions of different nature. In particular, it adopts a
broad approach to the above-mentioned topic, 45 providing that:
− The safety of healthcare is an essential part of the constitutional
right of health 46 and it is pursued on behalf of the individual and
of the community (art. 1, § 1);
45. For a general introduction to the 2017 Law, see GUIDO ALPA, LA
L. 8 MARZO 2017, N. 24 (Pacini
2017).
46. Art. 32, para. 1 Costituzione: “The Republic safeguards health as a fundamental right of the individual and as a collective interest, and guarantees free
medical care to the indigent.” This article depicts the general framework of the
right to health as a fundamental right of the human being, and as interest of the
community, combined with the guarantee of gratuitous treatment for needy people. The term “illness” has been used in a wide significance, encompassing both
general diseases and professional ones. A second feature of such right is the adequacy of the healthcare treatment pursuant to several initiatives at the international
level, like for example those carried out by the World Health Organization, the
principles enclosed in the Ottawa Chart of 1986 aiming at equity in health. See
Fernando Bocchini, Salute e sanità tra solidarietà e responsabilità, 1 CONTR.
IMPR. 126 (2018) (arguing that protection of the human health is a significant experience of rebuilding the effectiveness of a legal system in order to erase the gap
between theoretical declarations and the incongruity of real life, and stressing that
the current interpretation of art. 32 Cost. tends to grants constitutional value to
statutory provisions. As well, the regulations of the Consumer Code—i.e., Decreto Legge, Sept. 6, 2005, n. 206—art. 2 (2) (a), points out among the fundamental rights granted to consumers and users “the right to health’s protection,” and
that, pursuant to such provision, contractual terms aimed at limiting or excluding
the liability of the professional party in the event of death or personal injury suffered by the consumer as a consequence of an action or omission of the former
are held unfair).
RESPONSABILITÀ SANITARIA. COMMENTO ALLA
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− The safety of healthcare is achieved also through the complex of
all the activities aiming at the prevention and risk management
connected to the issuance of healthcare services and the appropriate use of the structural, technological, and organizational resources (art. 1, § 2). 47 For this purpose, in every region of Italy,
a center has been established for risk management and patient’s
safety aimed at collecting from private and public healthcare institutions the data related to adverse events and malpractice litigation.
− Article 3 establishes a National Observatory of the good customs
on safety in the healthcare system (Observatory) under the National Agency for Regional Healthcare Services (AGENAS).
The Observatory has the task:
• to collect, from the regional centers above, the data related to risks and adverse events, as well as to causes,
extent, frequency, and financial burden of the controversies;
• to draw up guidelines with the support of qualified scientific associations; and
• to identify appropriate measures in order to prevent and
manage health-risk with the aim of monitoring the good
customs, as well as for purposes of professional training,
and continuing education of the healthcare providers.
With reference to the professional activity of healthcare providers
and their liability, art. 5 sets forth specific rules according to which
47. In this regard, see Matteo Caputo, La responsabilità penale dell’esercente
la professione sanitaria dopo la L. n. 24 del 2017… “quo vadit”? Primi dubbi,
prime risposte, secondi dubbi, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 293, 297 (2017) (arguing that the emphasis on healthcare’s safety rather than on the right to health in
itself, is aimed at stressing the absence of a duty upon the professional to ensure
the patient’s healing. The former would therefore be obliged to apply the required
professional diligence but could not be held liable for not having achieved the
patient’s recovery). See also Adolfo di Majo, Il giudizio di responsabilità civile
del medico dopo la legge Gelli e cioè la perizia “guidata,” 4 GIUR. IT. 841 (2018)
(arguing about the legal effects of the criminal provisions of the 2017 Law within
the civil law’s field, and stressing the nature of obbligazione di mezzi (obligation
of means) charged upon the healthcare provider).
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healthcare providers executing health services for prevention, diagnostic, therapeutic, palliative, rehabilitation, and forensic medicine
purposes comply with the recommendations of the guidelines drawn
up by qualified selected scientific institutions and published pursuant to the procedure set forth in the same article, except for the peculiarities of the single case. In case of absence of the above-mentioned guidelines, health care professionals abide by good clinical
care practices. However, such behavioral duty must be tailored to
the specific case. If the peculiar circumstances of the case require a
different approach and/or behavior, the healthcare professional
shall, on a justified basis, depart from the above-mentioned recommendations. 48 Consequently, exceptions to the general rule can be
allowed with reference to the peculiarities of the single case.
In particular, the institutions referred to in art. 5 are included in
a list compiled and updated by the Ministry of Health. The guidelines and updates are integrated within the sistema nazionale per le
linee guida. 49 A further public entity operating under the Ministry
of Health, namely the Istituto superiore di sanità (ISS) is involved.
Indeed, the ISS, before publishing such guidelines on its websites,
shall previously verify (i) the compliance of the adopted methodology with a specified public standard, as well as (ii) the relevance of
scientific evidences declared in support of the recommendations.
Accordingly, the framework outlined by the 2017 Law is quite complex and involves different stakeholders, both private and public,
called to actively cooperate to the development of the national system of guidelines. Furthermore, the entities operating under the supervision of the Ministry of Health and its related agencies play a
fundamental role in selecting and verifying which guidelines should
be included in the system and must be complied with by healthcare
professionals.
48. Therefore, the approach adopted is that of “comply or explain.” See
Caputo, supra note 47, at 295.
49. SNLG, DELL’ISTITUTO SUPERIORE DI SANITÀ, https://perma.cc/48MH4T9Y.
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In addition, unlike the Balduzzi Law, the 2017 Law introduces
a hierarchical distinction between CPGs and good clinical practices.
In particular, the CPGs provided with the preeminent role granted
by such provision, are only those officially accredited and published
pursuant to the 2017 Law. The good clinical practices will come at
stake only when the first lacks, and they might also encompass
CPGs issued by (reliable) entities, but not (yet) accredited in the official system depicted by the 2017 Law. 50
Article 6 specifically deals with criminal liability of healthcare
providers, introducing a new provision in the Italian Criminal Code:
art. 590-sexies (fault liability for death or personal injuries in the
healthcare field). According to this article, if death or personal injuries occur within the exercise of healthcare professional activity, the
healthcare providers will be punished pursuant to arts. 589 and 590
C.p., 51 except for situations specified in art. 590-sexies, para. 2 C.p.
In fact, pursuant to the second paragraph of this provision, should
death or personal injury occur because of unskillfulness, punishment 52 is excluded when the recommendations set forth by the officially published CPGs—or, absent such guidelines, the good clinical
50. For critical remarks about the role of good clinical practices within malpractice trials (in particular when invoked by the defendant in a criminal judgment), see Francesco D’Alessandro, La responsabilità penale del sanitario alla
luce della riforma “Gelli-Bianco,” 5 DIR. PEN. PROC. 572, 578 (2017).
51. The articles respectively provide for manslaughter and personal injury.
52. The literal expression adopted by art. 6 of the 2017 Law related to art.
590-sexies C.p. is punibilità. Pursuant to the Italian Criminal Code and from a
strictly technical perspective, the “cause di estinzione della punibilità” are circumstances excluding the liability of the defendant although all the constitutive
elements of the crime have been met. FERRANDO MANTOVANI, I DIRITTO PENALE,
PARTE GENERALE 786 et seq. (9th ed., CEDAM 2015). However, the expression
has been used even in different meanings and its theoretical conceptualization has
not been properly built. Id. at 798. Yet, as constantly highlighted by Italian judges
(lastly by the Tarabori holding, Cass., sez. IV penale, Apr. 20, 2017-June 7, 2017,
n. 28187 [hereinafter Tarabori]—and authoritatively by the Supreme Court in the
Mariotti case, Cass., sez. Unite Penali, Dec. 21, 2017-Feb. 22, 2018, n. 8770
[hereinafter Mariotti] see infra, § IV, the Italian lawmaker in recent times adopted
the term punibilità in several, non-technical, and improper meanings, to express
different concepts; for example, criminal liability in general, or other circumstances able to exclude, even from a subjective point of view, the penalty. Accordingly, reference to exclusion of punibilità ought not to necessarily be intended
as implying a proper condition for the exclusion of the punishment. Pursuant to
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practices—have been complied with, as long as the recommendations above proved to be adequate to the peculiarities of the case.
Article 7 deals with civil liability of both the healthcare institution and the healthcare providers. In particular, solving problems of
proper qualification of the nature of the liabilities above, it draws a
distinction between the institution, on the one side, and the
healthcare professional, on the other. 53 Indeed, the institution that,
in order to perform its obligation, avails itself of the activity of
healthcare providers, is contractually liable because of the intentional or negligent behavior of these professionals according to arts.
1218 and 1228 C.c. The liability of the structure has a contractual
nature and it is legally grounded on the direct liability of the institution towards the patient combined with elements of its vicarious liability. 54
The healthcare provider is liable under art. 2043 C.c., unless she
has performed in execution of a contractual relationship with the patient. This being the exception, the general rule is that the healthcare
provider is liable towards the patient under tort law. The distinction
above affects, in particular, the procedural burden of proof, heavier
for the patient in case of tortious liability pursuant to art. 2043 C.c., 55

the Tarabori Court, the term at stake shall therefore be intended as non-technical
reference to the process of assessing the liability of the defendant in light of the
degree of the fault (see Tarabori, supra note 52, § 10.1). Since there is no consensus among courts and among scholars about the proper qualification of the term
punibilità within art. 590-sexies C.p., in the present essay it has been translated
into “punishment,” thereby referring to the element of the sanction pursuant to the
concept of punibilità encompassed within the Criminal Code, although being
aware of the possible non-technical meaning of such expression.
53. See, e.g,, Roberto Pardolesi, Chi (vince e chi) perde nella riforma della
responsabilità sanitaria, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 261, 264 (2017) (arguing
that the 2017 Law has introduced a “dual-track” system of remedies); Giuseppe
Pavich, La responsabilità penale dell’esercente la professione sanitaria: cosa
cambia con la legge Gelli-Bianco, 7-8 CASS. PEN. 2961 (2017) (expressing critical
remarks about the distinction between different kinds of liability).
54. Alpa, Ars interpretandi, supra note 5, at 728-729; Massimo Franzoni,
Colpa e linee guida nella nuova legge, 3 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 271, 273
l(2017).
55. Generally, in case of tortious liability, the patient or, more broadly, the
victim shall prove (i) the damage; (ii) the intentional or negligent behavior of the
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and liberative prescription, which amounts to 5 years in case of tortious liability, and 10 years in case of contractual liability.
In particular, art. 7 of the 2017 Law refers to three different situations: (1) the patient chooses a private practice physician, (2) the
patient refers to a public or private hospital and is treated by a physician employed there; and (3) the patient avails herself of the professional activity of her general practitioner or of a physician employed by a public or private institution, but allowed to practice privately within the institution itself. 56 In the first and in the third case,
the relationship between the physician and the patient is governed
by the law of contracts. 57 The second case used to qualify as contractual too on the basis of the doctrine of contatto sociale (i.e., a de

alleged tortfeasor; (iii) the element of causation between (i) and (ii); (iv) the unlawful nature of the damage (i.e., the harm to a legally protected interest, see
Brüggemeier, supra note 22, at 4, 7-8). On the contrary, under a contractual liability regime, the victim shall prove (i) the existence of a contractual relationship
with the other party; (ii) the breach of the contractual obligation by the other party;
and (iii) the damage; consequently, it will be up to the alleged breaching party to
demonstrate that nonfeasance or improper performance is not due to her fault.
However, such general rules have been affected by the judicial interpretation and
evolution.
56. See, e.g., Ubaldo Perfetti, La responsabilità civile del medico tra legge
cd. Gelli e nuova disciplina del consenso informato, 2 GIUST. CIV. 359 (2018).
57. With regard to the first and third case, the new rules do not change the
previous judicial achievements, particularly with reference to the burden of proof.
Such rule indeed shall be tailored with the case when the obligation undertaken
by the professional is an obbligazione di risultato (obligation of result) whereby
the professional guarantees a specific result or, on the contrary, whether it is an
obbligazione di mezzi (obligation of means) whereby the same guarantees to apply
her best care, though not ensuring any results. Such distinction affects the relevant
burden of proof. Pursuant to art. 1218 C.c., in the first case it is up to the debtor
to prove that the nonfeasance is due to force majeure, whilst in the second case it
is up to the creditor to prove the negligence and the breach of the duty of care by
the debtor. Traditionally, the obligation of the physician used to be an obligation
of means. See, e.g., Gaetano E. Napoli, La responsabilità sanitaria nel sistema
civilistico. Punti fermi e nuove linee di riforma, 1 RESP. CIV. PREV. 103, 112-113
(2017). However, such qualification has been criticized by many authors arguing
that the distinction above has only descriptive value and lacks any prescriptive
force, and it has been subject to a progressive judicial evolution, culminating with
the holding of the Supreme Court, July 28, 2005, n. 15781 arguing that every
obligation requires at the same time the coexistence of the debtor’s behavior together with a result, although in variable proportion, and thus affirming that the
evidentiary mechanism is the same in any case of alleged breach of contractual
obligation. A further judicial attack to the relevance of the distinction above has
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facto relationship between the physician and the patient giving rise
to legal obligations according to art. 1173 C.c.). However, due to the
2017 Law, it is now governed by the law of torts. 58
been carried out with the recognition of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, distinguishing between routine and non-routine interventions. In particular, the ease of the
intervention and/or its routine-nature imply the reversal of the burden of proof up
to the professional charged with the demonstration that the unsuccessful result is
not due to her fault. See Giovanni Pascuzzi, Malpractice: la colpa del medico è
presunta se l’intervento è di “facile esecuzione,” in 1 LEX AQUILIA - LA
RESPONSABILITÀ MEDICA 16 (Giovanni Pascuzzi ed., Zanichelli 2005). Subsequently, such distinction has been abandoned on the assumption that the risk-allocation cannot be linked to the difficulty of the intervention and the tribunals
used to require by the professionals the proof of an event beyond their control and
not reasonably predictable and/or avoidable. See, e.g., Claudio Scognamiglio,
Regole di condotta, modelli di responsabilità e risarcimento del danno nella
nuova legge sulla responsabilità sanitaria, 6 CORR. GIUR. 740, 741-744 (2017).
Furthermore, Italian courts used to apply the rule of the so called “proximity of
the evidence” whereby the relevant burden shall be charged to the breaching party
because this party possesses the elements to paralyze the creditor’s claim, see Supreme Court, Joint Civil Division, Oct. 20, 2001, n. 13533. As for the specific
area of medical malpractice, the rule of proximity of the evidence is interpreted
in the sense that the patient alleging the professional’s nonfeasance shall demonstrate the existence of the contract with the hospital or the healthcare institution
together with the source of the contatto sociale with the physician, and then it is
up to the defendant to prove the absence of any fault in the contractual performance. Such shift in the burden of proof has been identified among the factors
increasing medical malpractice claims, on one side, and the practice of defensive
medicine on the other, even after the enactment of the Balduzzi Law. Indeed, as
above mentioned, despite the express characterization in such Law of the
healthcare professional’s liability as tortious, Italian courts carried on in affirming
its contractual nature thus applying such evidentiary rules. For critical remarks,
see Giovanna Visintini, La colpa medica nella responsabilità civile, 3 CONTR.
IMPR. 530 (2015). On the contrary, the 2017 Law straightforwardly affirms the
tortious nature of the physician if employed by a public or private healthcare institution, and not involved in a pre-existing contractual relationship with the patient; and vice versa, should a contractual relationship occur between the patient
and the healthcare provider, the latter would be judged on the basis of the abovementioned contractual rules.
58. The characterization of the healthcare professional’s liability as tortious
implies, on one side, the compensation of even not predictable damages pursuant
to art. 2056 C.c., and, on the other, the application of the regime provided for by
art. 2050 C.c. if the relevant requirements are met. Such a norm deals with liability
due to the exercise of dangerous activities (art 2050 C.c.—Liability arising from
the exercise of dangerous activities: “Whoever causes injury to another in the performance of an activity dangerous by its nature or by reason of the instrumentalities employed, is liable in damages, unless she proves to have taken all suitable
measures to avoid the injury”). The range of application of this article has been
investigated by the doctrine and the Italian courts under two different aspects. The
first issue dealt with the nature of such liability: currently, the majority view describes it as strict liability whilst, according to a minority opinion, the norm would
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Furthermore, non-pecuniary damage suffered by the patient
shall be compensated referring to thresholds and parameters set
forth in the charts outlined by arts. 138 and 139 of the Code of Private Insurance. 59 Finally, art. 7 clarifies that the provisions above
are mandatory.
The Balduzzi law affirmed the tortious nature of medical liability, leaving the burden of proof on the plaintiff. However, as previously indicated, 60 this clear legislative choice did not prevent Italian
courts to carry on adjudicating that the professional had a contractual relationship with the patient, in particular if employed by a
healthcare institution: liability ended up being contractual and the
burden of proof was consequently reallocated. Therefore, in light of
the clash between the Balduzzi qualification of professional liability
as tortious, and the judicial interpretation of this liability as contractual, the emphasis of art. 7 in clarifying the mandatory nature of the

give rise to a mere rebuttable presumption of liability upon the party exercising a
dangerous activity. As known, the strict liability characterization affects the relevant burden of proof in favor of the victim. The second issue dealt with the possibility to include the healthcare activities within the category of “dangerous activities” encompassed by such article. The answer given by the judicial formant
is affirmative because, besides the list of dangerous activities filled in by specific
Laws or other normative provisions, Italian courts admit the possibility to include
other atypical activities on a quam in concreto basis, to be therefore assessed case
by case. Such extensive orientation is also upheld by authoritative statutory precedents, in particular art. 15 of the Privacy Code according to which “whoever
causes a damage as effect of the personal data processing shall compensate such
damage pursuant to art. 2050 C.c.” Consequently, for the purposes of Italian law,
the personal data processing is deemed a dangerous activity. See Perfetti, supra
note 56, § 10.
59. See Decreto Legislativo Sept. 7, 2005, n. 209. With regard to the compensation of damage, the express reference to the thresholds set forth in the Code
of Private Insurance has been interpreted in a double sense: on one side, in light
of the legislative will to put a cap on damages and, on the other, in light of the
need to personalize and tailor the assessment of damages, as commonly applied
in the insurance field, but with a peculiar feature. In the case of the insurance, the
criteria to personalize the damage even increasing it up to the triple, are exclusively focused on the victim; on the contrary, in the healthcare field what matters
for the purposes of decreasing or increasing the amount of damages is the professional behaviour of the healthcare provider and her level of compliance with the
accredited CPGs or the good clinical practices. See Alpa, Ars Interpretandi, supra
note 5, at 731.
60. See supra, § II.
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provisions at stake seems aimed at definitively solving this hermeneutical issue and avoiding any further different interpretations.
The 2017 Law has been implemented by means of two Ministry
of Health’s decrees addressing essential elements. In particular, the
first decree points out the list of accredited scientific associations
and technical-scientific associations of the healthcare professions, 61
while the second establishes the above-mentioned Observatory of
the good clinical practices on healthcare safety. 62
Since the task of elaborating the relevant guidelines, pursuant to
the scheme drawn up by the 2017 Law, pertains to public and private
entities, as well as to scientific and technical-scientific associations
of the healthcare professions purposely included in a public list, the
first decree points out the criteria to be included in the list of selected
entities. The list will be updated on a two-year basis. In order to be
included in such list, associations shall demonstrate to have:
− national relevance, namely to have a direct or indirect branch or
subsidiary within at least 12 Regions;
− representativeness of at least 30% of professionals (who are not
retired) of the specific field of expertise;
− proved independence from entrepreneurial activities and lack of
profit-making purposes;
− compliance with the duty to publish the scientific activity of the
association on its website, to be constantly updated;
− absence of wage for the company’s officer positions;
− among the entity’s purposes, lack of the aim to provide laborunion assistance to its members and absence of any direct or indirect labor-union activity; and
− broadest participation of the members to the activities and decisions of the association.

61. Decreto Aug. 2, 2017, G.U. n. 186.
62. Decreto Sept. 29, 2017, G.U. n. 248.
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The requirements above are, therefore, quite strict 63 and should
the association subsequently lose one or more of them, it might be
first suspended and then erased from the list.
The second decree establishes the Observatory within the
AGENAS. As previously mentioned, the Observatory is called to
carry out, in accordance to the directions of healthcare planning as
defined by the Ministry of Health, very important tasks, in particular
dealing with the collection of statistical data, drawing up of CPGs,
and risk-management activities. Both decrees play an important role
with reference to the criminal liability of the healthcare provider. In
particular, the first decree concurs to select and outline the sources
of reference for the behavior of the healthcare professionals (and,
from a different perspective, concurs to select and outline the standard of behavior to be adopted by judges when assessing their liability). Worthy of attention is the fact that healthcare professionals
shall comply with the sole recommendations set forth by the guidelines published in accordance with the 2017 Law and drafted by the
accredited institutions.
The 2017 Law has apparently deprived first the physicians and
then the courts of the power to evaluate the reliability and credibility
of the guidelines. 64 This, in the majority of the opinions, has represented a worthy effort to avoid uncertainties arising from the large
number of available guidelines, not all of the same value, 65 and to
interrupt the recourse to “posthumous” identification of guidelines.

63. On Oct. 23, 2017, the Ministry of Health issued an official circular in
order to clarify the doubts arisen about the proper interpretation of the requirements above and their range of application.
64. Cristiano Cupelli, L’eterointegrazione della legge Gelli-Bianco:
aggiornamenti in tema di linee guida “certificate” e responsabilità penale in
ambito sanitario, 10 DIR. PEN. CONT. 266, 268 (2017).
65. See, ex multis, Carlo Scorretti, Le linee guida nella medicina moderna e
nella recente normativa italiana, in RESPONSABILITÀ E LINEE GUIDA 103-114
(Gian Marco Caletti et al. eds., EPG Udine 2018). See also Justin Kung et al.,
Failure of Clinical Practice Guidelines to Meet Institute of Medicine Standards,
172 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1628 (2012) (focusing on the problem of conflict of interests among the members of the entities called to issue CPGs and
providing statistical data about such phenomenon).
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This used to be a strategy developed under the dominion of the previous legal regime (i.e., the Balduzzi Law). 66 The express duty to
abide by existing, published, and clearly identified CPGs, puts an
end to this strategy. Furthermore, the ex-ante perspective is important because it takes into account all potential recipients and beneficiaries, and not just the injured parties or the parties involved in a
trial. As highlighted, art. 5 of the 2017 Law introduces a general rule
requiring the compliance with the accredited guidelines working
both in the area of civil (and, for certain purposes, criminal) liability
as a criterion to assess the skillfulness of the physician and for the
quantification of damages.
A further aim of the new law is to avoid uncertainties due to the
reliability of the scientific association involved as well as conflicts
among different and inconsistent recommendations. The process of
controlled selection of guidelines to be included in the national official database immediately carries out a distinction between reliable
and not-reliable guidelines (at least for the purposes of the 2017
Law). Finally, the new system should solve the issue of conflict of
interests among stakeholders and guidelines’ issuers affecting the
reliability of clinical guidelines as well.
IV. JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTY
To summarize, the 2017 Law, by introducing a rebuttable presumption of lack of punishment, not only opened new and significant issues in respect to the previous legislative regulation, but it
seems to have failed the task of ensuring the certainty of lack of
liability in cases of compliance with the officially accredited CPGs.
Indeed, the 2017 Law, according to the majority of commentators
and to a significant judicial orientation, appears less favorable to
healthcare providers than the Balduzzi Law. 67
66. See supra, § II.
67. See Tarabori and Mariotti rulings, supra note 52, and relevant comments.
See also Cristiano Cupelli, L’art. 590-sexies C.p. nelle motivazioni delle sezioni
unite: un’interpretazione costituzionalmente conforme dell’imperizia medica
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The first opportunity for the Supreme Court to deal with the
2017 Law was the Tarabori case. 68 In this case, the Fourth Criminal
Division of the Supreme Court highlights the functions of art. 5,
which “entails a real foundation of the ways to exercise of healthcare
professions.” 69 Within such a system, the guidelines are intended as
“general directives that shall face the peculiarities of each case, and
shall adapt themselves to it.” 70 In particular, the Tarabori holding
points out “the clear legislative intention to build up an institutional
public system aimed at regulating the healthcare activities, able to
ensure their development in a uniform and appropriate manner, in
compliance with controlled scientific evidences” in order to “overrule uncertainties that occurred after the enactment of the Balduzzi
Law with reference to the criteria to properly identify the scientifically qualified directives,” 71 as well as to avoid the dangers of degenerations due to guidelines affected by conflict of interest or not
scientifically grounded. This is done “[i]n order to foster the uniform
application of accredited and virtuous directives.” 72
As noted by the Supreme Court, the legislative choice not only
guarantees “to the healthcare institution, the governance of the medical profession,” but it also “has a significant impact on the professional who must comply with the recommendations although with
the adaptations required by each case” and is “legitimately entitled
(ancora) punibile, DIR. PEN. CONT. Mar. 1, 2018 (arguing that the 2017 Law has
failed its alleged purposes); Pier Francesco Poli, Il D.D.L. Gelli-Bianco: verso
un’ennesima occasione persa di adeguamento della responsabilità penale del
medico ai principi costituzionali?, 2 DIR. PEN. CONT. 67 (2017) (expressing
several critical remarks to the 2017 Law). But see also Gian Marco Caletti &
Matteo Leonida Mattheudakis, Una prima lettura della legge “Gelli-Bianco”
nella prospettiva del diritto penale, 2 DIR. PEN. CONT. 84 (2017) (pointing out
some positive elements of the 2017 Law).
68. See Tarabori, supra note 52.
69. See id. § 7.5 (analyzing the effects of the 2017 Law from a wider perspective, encompassing both the domain of criminal liability and that of civil liability,
see also § 7.4, as linked by the overall approach adopted by such Law).
70. Id. § 7.5.
71. The Court expressly argues that, under the Balduzzi Law, the CPGs
counted as scientific directives for the healthcare provider and their compliance
amounted to a “protective shield” against unjustified claims. Id. § 6.
72. Id. § 7.5.

2018]

ITALY

397

to rely on the fact that her behavior shall be assessed pursuant to the
same recommendations she must abide by.” 73 In light of such remarks, the Supreme Court infers that the system introduced by the
2017 Law “provides an unprecedented regulatory framework, focused on the modalities of execution of the healthcare profession
and of the assessment of negligence,” which offers to the judge “precise directions in order to evaluate the liability of the provider.” 74
In particular, the holding points out the paradoxical consequences of a literal interpretation of the norm, according to which a
physician (or any other healthcare professional) could escape liability even though she caused harm to the patient if it is demonstrated
that the physician acted in compliance with qualified directives. 75
The Fourth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court has, thus,
deemed that the text of art. 590-sexies C.p., as introduced within the
Penal Code by art. 6 of the 2017 Law, is affected by “obvious” traits
and by a “logical incompatibility” with the overall rationale of the
provision itself, as well as with the general principles of the Italian
legal system.
In brief, according to the Court, a literal interpretation of the article would make it unconstitutional. The paradigmatic example offered by the Court is the case of a surgeon planning and executing,
in compliance with the relevant clinical guidelines, an operation for
the removal of an abdominal neoplasm, who, in the executive moment, due to a huge and tragic mistake, severs an artery rather than
the peduncle of the neoplasm, thus causing the death of the patient.
In the opinion of the Court, following the literal interpretation of the
provision at stake would lead to exclude the surgeon’s liability. Accordingly, since the outcome would be unfair and unlawful because
it would amount to a breach of the right to health set forth in art. 32
of the Italian Constitution, and would negatively affect civil claims
of medical malpractice and the related compensation of damage, as
73. Id. § 8.2.
74. Id. § 7.5.
75. Id. § 7.4.

398

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 11

well as the constitutional principle of equality set forth in art. 3 (because the legal regime applied to healthcare professionals would be
“irrationally” different than that applied to other equally risky and
difficult professions), this interpretation was rejected by the Court. 76
In light of the above reasoning, the sole interpretation allowed by
the “unhappy” lexical phrasing of the 2017 Law is that, when it is a
matter of unskillful behavior, the healthcare provider 77 shall not be
held liable if she complied with the officially accredited guidelines
and there were no reasons to depart from them.
Consequently, the Tarabori Court, emphasizing the purposes of
the 2017 Law and particularly the new system of accredited guidelines, holds that the physician complying with the accredited guidelines, save the peculiarities of each case, is entitled to expect that her
behavior will be judged pursuant to the same clinical guidelines. 78
Therefore, for the purposes of the new art. 590-sexies C.p., the assessment of liability shall be carried out taking into account the involved clinical guidelines, which must be pertinent and whose reliability and adequacy to the specific case shall be previously investigated by the judge, called to focus this assessment upon the moment
of implementation of the guidelines by the healthcare professional.
Within the described range of application, the healthcare provider is
consequently entitled to be judged pursuant to the standard set by
the same guidelines she shall comply with.
Accordingly, the role of CPGs as drawn up by both art. 5. and
art. 6 of the 2017 Law ends up to be neglected because any “automatic” waiver of liability (or any “protective shield”) generated by
the compliance with the officially accredited guidelines, is denied.

76. Id.
77. The 2017 Law, as pointed out, deals with the liability of the healthcare
provider in general. However, all the three holdings of the Supreme Court address
the case of medical malpractice and liability of the physician, thus referring their
reasoning to the latter category. Nevertheless, except for the peculiarities of each
healthcare profession, the interpretation provided by the Court applies to
healthcare providers in general.
78. See Tarabori, supra note 52, § 8.2.
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A confirmation of such effect can be found in the fact that, in comparing the Balduzzi regime with that of the 2017 Law for inter-temporary purposes related to the principle of non-retroactivity of the
criminal provision, the Tarabori Court found the Balduzzi Law more
favorable to healthcare providers than the 2017 Law.
Four months after the Tarabori ruling, the Fourth Criminal Division (with a different composition) dealt again with the 2017 Law
and, in particular, with art. 590-sexies C.p. However, the Court embraced a completely different interpretation and never mentioned the
earlier ruling. 79 The Cavazza holding points out that the specific
field of application of art. 590-sexies, para. 2 C.p. is that of the unskilled execution of proper and adequate clinical guidelines. 80 Consequently, the so-called imperitia in executivis would shield the
healthcare provider from criminal liability, while the imperitia in
eligendo, namely the incorrect selection of the guideline or the adoption of a non-adequate guideline, would lead to affirm her criminal
liability. 81 This is the rule set forth by the holding at stake, which is
reached through an articulated ratio decidendi.
First of all, the Fourth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court,
sitting with different judges than those of the Tarabori holding, highlights what the elements of certainty introduced by the 2017 Law
are: first, the specific abrogation of art. 3 of the Balduzzi Law, together with the consequent overtaking of the issue of the degree of
fault; second, the clear legislative choice to apply the waiver of liability set forth in the second paragraph of art. 590-sexies C.p. only
to the event of unskillfulness (thus, excluding from its range of application cases of negligence and carelessness). 82
On the contrary, among the controversial elements of the 2017
Law, the Court stresses the role of CPGs as outlined by the
lawmaker. It points to the operational difficulties in distinguishing
79.
80.
81.
82.

Cass., sez. IV penale, Oct. 19-31, 2017, n. 50078 [hereinafter Cavazza].
Id. § 7.
Id.
Id. § 6.
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between unskillfulness, negligence, and carelessness, since these
concepts are adjoining and often overlapping. It insists that in a case
of gross fault, it would be extremely difficult to find that the
circumstances to release the physician from liability, as set forth by
the art. 590-sexies C.p., are fulfilled. 83
Consequently, in order to avoid the highlighted issues—and to
save the rationale of the 2017 Law—the Cavazza Court provides an
interpretation aimed at enhancing as much as possible the letter and
the purposes of this law. In particular, in the opinion of the Court,
the clear intent of the 2017 Law is to avoid any differences in the
degree of fault in the event of harm due to unskillfulness of the
healthcare provider. Consequently, when the requirements of art.
590-sexies, para 2 C.p. are fulfilled, even the gross fault shall be
excused. 84 In addition, pursuant to this interpretation, the intent of
the 2017 Law is to specifically favor the position of the physician
by decreasing the possibility of a criminal liability, without prejudice to civil liability, thereby ensuring to patients the compensation
of the suffered damages. 85
The keystone of the new regime are the accredited CPGs and the
mandatory requirement for healthcare professionals to comply with
them or, in the absence thereof, with the good clinical customs, provided that both prove to be adequate to the circumstances of the specific case. Accordingly, the “causa di non punibilità,” as outlined
by the Court, loses any subjective connotations to assume an objective feature:
[T]he surrender to sanction the physician is justified in light
of the lawmaker’s choice not to mortify the initiative of the
professional because of the fear of unfair retaliations, thus
discharging the physician from punishment in reason of a
mere judgment of criminal policy’s opportunity in order to

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 7.
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restore the operational serenity of the physician and thereby
preventing the phenomenon of defensive medicine. 86
Therefore, in the sole case of unskillfulness, criminal liability
will hinge on the adequacy of the accredited guidelines: should these
guidelines be held adequate, the physician would not incur criminal
liability even in cases of gross unskillfulness. On the contrary,
should the guidelines be held not appropriate to the circumstances
of the case, the physician will be found liable even in cases of slight
unskillfulness. However, it has been also stressed by the Court that
the physician’s unskilled behavior will be excused only if the mistake occurred in the execution of the appropriate guideline. On the
contrary, should the mistake occur ab initio in the selection of the
guideline, liability will be maintained. Finally, pointing out the positive effects of the new provisions, the Cavazza Court did not seem
to doubt the constitutionality of the 2017 Law.
The two holdings differ from each other, adopting opposite interpretations of the 2017 Law. The Cavazza Court highlighted the
purpose of this law in light of the announced intent of the lawmaker
to provide a “safe harbor” to healthcare providers vis-a-vis the malpractice claims in cases of unskillful behavior. In order to reach such
aim, the Court emphasized the letter of the 2017 Law and, in particular, of art. 590-sexies C.p. deeming that both cases of slight and
gross unskillfulness (in the execution of proper guidelines) shall discharge the healthcare provider from criminal liability, although
without prejudice to the civil liability. Accordingly, the Court has
stressed the determinant role played by CPGs to release from liability the professionals who abide by them, insofar as they prove to be
adequate to the specific case.
However, the Cavazza interpretation raises issues as to the compatibility of the new provisions with, in particular, the principle of
equality and the fundamental right to health, as respectively set forth
in arts. 3 and 32 of the Italian Constitution. To avoid a possible clash
86. Id.
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with constitutional norms, the Tarabori Court provided an interpretation so strict as to deprive the 2017 Law of its (alleged) innovative
potential. Pursuant to this ruling, the liability waiver regime
grounded upon the system of accredited CPGs tended to be disregarded. Therefore, the interpretation adopted by the Tarabori Court
has been qualified as interpretatio abrogans. 87
In addition, from the perspective of the Tarabori holding, the
Balduzzi Law is more favorable than the 2017 Law. On the contrary,
according to the Cavazza holding, the result of the comparison is
exactly the opposite: this clash would lead to antithetical outcomes
in cases involving inter-temporary matters in light of the principles
of non-retroactivity of the criminal law, and retroactivity of the more
favorable provisions derived from art. 2 C.p. and art. 25 of the Italian
Constitution.
The crucial importance of the issue, and the clear conflict of interpretations about the letter of the 2017 Law arisen within the
Fourth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court, urged the intervention of the Joint Criminal Division in order to clarify the meaning
and the range of application of this law and aimed at providing the
lower courts, the Italian society, and the whole public of stakeholders with an authentic interpretation of the 2017 Law (namely of the
art. 590-sexies C.p. as introduced by art. 6 of the 2017 Law).
In the Mariotti holding, 88 the Joint Criminal Division of the Supreme Court offered a third and different interpretation of the provisions. In the opinion of the Court: (i) the Tarabori Court upholds
an interpretatio abrogans of the 2017 Law clashing with the clear
intent of the law and with the previous judicial achievements; (ii)
the Cavazza Court grants a too broad range of application to the
waiver of liability system set forth by the 2017 Law, therefore raising constitutional issues of the law in light of the principles of equality among professionals (art. 3) and protection of the patient’s health

87. See Mariotti supra, note 52.
88. Id.
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(art. 32). The Joint Division in the Mariotti ruling affirms that the
release of the healthcare professional from liability occurs when the
harmful event is caused by the slight unskillfulness of the professional during the execution of the adequate accredited guidelines. 89
On the contrary, gross unskillfulness will not discharge from liability, in order to avoid any discrimination with the liability regime of
other professionals and to avoid any charge of unconstitutionality of
the 2017 Law. 90 The milestone of the present ruling is, therefore, the
concept of “slight unskillfulness.” 91 However, it is noteworthy that
the 2017 Law does not mention at all the term slight and does not
make any references to the degree of the unskilled behavior.
Pursuant to the Court, the degree of fault in the form of the unskillfulness is justified in light of three main reasons. First, because
of art. 2236 C.c. that specifically distinguishes between slight and

89. In the opinion of the Court, CPGs are not a shield against any kind of
liability, since their value and legal effects depend upon their proved suitability to
the peculiar circumstances of the specific case. Pursuant to the Court, then, such
freedom of assessment granted to the healthcare provider, is aimed at preserving
the professional’s autonomy, thus avoiding any “bureaucratic flattering out.”
Therefore, the formalization of the leges artis would amount to a cultural change
occurred in a new socio-professional context where the complex of expertise and
know-how of the individual becomes a shared asset of the whole scientific community. See Mariotti, supra note 52, § 3.
90. The principle expressed by the Mariotti Court is:
The healthcare provider is liable on the basis of fault for the manslaughter or personal injuries deriving from the performance of a medical-surgical activity:
a) if the event occurred as a consequence of negligence (even ‘slight’)
due to carelessness or imprudence;
b) if the event occurred as a consequence of negligence (even ‘slight’)
due to the unskillful behavior when the specific case is not governed by
the recommendations of the CPGs or of the good clinical practices;
c) if the event occurred as a consequence of negligence (even ‘slight’)
due to the unskillful behavior in the selection and choice of CPGs or
good clinical practices which are not adequate to the peculiar circumstances of the case;
d) if the event occurred as a consequence of gross negligence due to the
unskillful behavior in implementing the recommendations of adequate
CPGs or good clinical practices, taking into account both the level of risk
to manage and the specific technical difficulties of the medical act.
See Mariotti, supra note 52, § 11.
91. Id. §§ 9, 10, 10.3 & 11.

404

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 11

gross negligence and that, although not directly applicable to criminal liability, yet underlies a general principle operating in the criminal area as well, as held by the Italian Constitutional Court. 92 Second, because of art. 3 of the Balduzzi Law that explicitly defined a
spectrum of criminal fault. 93 Third, because the preliminary drafts
of the 2017 Law used to specifically distinguish between slight and
gross unskillfulness. Therefore, the lack of the distinction in the official draft of the 2017 Law ought to be ascribed to an unintentional
omission of the lawmaker. 94
The second and the third reasons have been criticized because
art. 3 of the Balduzzi Law has been expressly abrogated by art. 6 of
the 2017 Law. Consequently, it seems difficult to argue that the criteria of art. 3 of the Balduzzi Law should still influence a regime
that has clearly superseded this provision. 95 These arguments have
also been criticized because it is difficult to argue that the text of the
2017 Law, currently in force, did not intend to exclude the degree of
fault although such distinction lacks in its binding and official version. 96
From a practical point of view, a further criticism to this interpretation is the widely acknowledged difficulty in distinguishing between carelessness, negligence, and unskillfulness. Consequently,
these uncertainties might foster charges grounded on carelessness
and negligence, thus bypassing the application of art. 590-sexies
C.c. and its exegetical concerns: this would lead to an “escape” in
the concepts of carelessness and negligence. 97
92. Id. §§ 9.2 & 10.1.
93. Id. §§ 8.2, 9.2 & 10.2.
94. Id. § 10.3.
95. See, e.g., Rocco Blaiotta, Niente resurrezioni, per favore. A proposito di
S.U. Mariotti in tema di responsabilità medica, DIR. PEN. CONT. May 28, 2018,
available at https://perma.cc/36LB-NKH5; Paolo Piras, Un distillato di
nomofilachia: l’imperizia lieve intrinseca quale causa di non punibilità del
medico, DIR. PEN. CONT. April, 20 2018, available at https://perma.cc
/WUD7-6QU5 [hereinafter Piras, Un distillato di nomofilachia].
96. See Piras, Un distillato di nomofilachia, supra note 95.
97. Cristiano Cupelli, La legge Gelli-Bianco e il primo vaglio della
Cassazione: linee guida sì, ma con giudizio, 6 DIR. PEN. CONT. 280, 284 (2017).
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Consequently, rather than referring the issue to the Constitutional Court, as requested by the Attorney General in his conclusive
remarks as well as by many commentators, the Joint Criminal Division of the Supreme Court rewrote the text of the law by adding the
term “slight.” According to some commentators, the text of the 2017
Law was rewritten in malam partem because the interpretation rules
that the gross unskillfulness is out of the range of application of art.
590-sexies, para. 2 C.p., thus enlarging cases of liability. 98
In addition, the interpretation provided by the Mariotti holding
does not eliminate the logical incompatibility, highlighted by the
Tarabori Court, between compliance with the accredited guidelines
and unskillful behavior. Consequently, as well summarized by a
commentator, “unskillfulness in executivis:
− pursuant to the Tarabori Court, non excusat: interpretatio abrogans;
− pursuant to the Cavazza Court, semper excusat: interpretatio latissima;
− pursuant to the Mariotti Court, excusat si levis: interpretatio stricta.” 99
Furthermore, according to the Mariotti holding, which upholds
the Tarabori’s remarks regarding this issue, the Balduzzi Law is
more favorable than the 2017 Law. Thus, the Balduzzi Law shall be
applied in cases involving matters of inter-temporary law. 100 Should
the Mariotti ruling be the final word regarding the 2017 Law, the
Italian lawmaker would have missed the opportunity to reduce the
area of criminal liability of the healthcare provider and decrease the
practice of defensive medicine. 101
98. Piras, supra note 95, at 10.
99. Id. at 4.
100. See Mariotti, supra note 52, § 12.
101. For further comments to the Mariotti ruling, see, e.g., Gian Marco Caletti
& Matteo Leonida Mattheudakis, La fisionomia dell’art. 590-sexies C.p. dopo le
Sezioni Unite tra nuovi spazi di graduazione dell’imperizia e “antiche” incertezze,
4 DIR. PEN. CONT. 25 (2018); Roberto Bartoli, Riforma Gelli-Bianco e Sezioni
Unite non placano il tormento: una proposta per limitare la colpa medica, 5 DIR.
PEN. CONT. 233 (2018); Bartolomeo Romano, La responsabilità penale
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It has been noted 102 that, following the Mariotti holding, the
Fourth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court might either decide
to submit again the issue at stake at the Joint Division pursuant to
art. 618 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure or to refer the
issue of the unconstitutionality of the art. 590-sexies C.p. to the Constitutional Court. Alternatively, Italian judges might decide to adhere to the Mariotti’s perspective, thus enhancing the role of art.
2236 C.c. as an expression of a general principle operating even
within the criminal matter. 103
In a subsequent case, 104 the Fourth Criminal Division seems to
have followed the third option. The case involved a neurologist
charged with the death of a patient: a young woman died due to a
syncope provoked by a severe arrhythmogenic heart disease. The
neurologist was held liable for using the Tilt test in lieu of a 12-lead
electrocardiogram (ECG). The latter exam would have allowed the
doctor to properly identify the disease suffered by the patient,
whereas the former was not adequate for this purpose. The absence
of a prompt diagnosis prevented the appropriate treatment.
The case provides the Fourth Division with the opportunity to
recap the achievements about medical malpractice in light of the
2017 Law and of the Joint Division’s judgment. First, the therapeutic relationship between the physician and the patient implies the
duty for the former to protect the life and the health of the latter.
Second, ongoing medical science developments decrease the room
for the individual dimension of the medical practice in favor of the
standardized, multitasking, and multidisciplinary one. However,

dell’esercente la professione sanitaria tra antichi dubbi e nuovi problemi, DIR.
Nov. 16, 2018, available at https://perma.cc/ZRW4-ZMR8.
102. Piras, supra note 95, at 11.
103. See, e.g., Carlo Brusco, Responsabilità medica penale: le Sezioni Unite
applicano le regole sulla responsabilità civile del prestatore d’opera, 5 DIR. PEN.
PROC. 646 (2018).
104. Cass., sez. IV penale, Jan. 12-Apr. 5, 2018, n. 15718 [hereinafter Tessitore].
PEN. CONT.
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this assumption must be adapted to the principle of personal criminal
liability. 105
Finally, the Court focuses on the role of clinical guidelines and
their suitability to act as legal standard for the assessment of professional liability. In particular, moving from the previous holdings, the
Court bestows such guidelines, and their proper selection and application by the healthcare provider, with a determinant role, although
excluding their binding nature as a legal standard. 106 However, the
element worth mentioning is the fact that the neurologist was held
liable not on the ground of his unskillful behavior, but rather on the
charge of negligence. Accordingly, the potential application of art.
590-sexies C.p. has been ab origine excluded since unskillfulness
was not involved.
In light of this approach, the holding has been subject to critical
remarks, first, because of the difficulty in distinguishing between
“unskillful behavior” and “negligence” (and the fact that in this case
the two concepts tended to overlap) and, second, because the risk of
the (alleged) escape in the two different types of fault. 107
V. THE ISSUE OF INFORMED CONSENT
Although aimed at addressing from a broad perspective the patient-provider relationship as well as the topic of the professional’s
liability, the 2017 Law does not specifically deal with the issue of

105. Id. §§ 4.1-7.
106. Id. §§ 4.2-4.3-6. See also Lucia Risicato, Il nuovo statuto penale della
colpa medica: un discutibile progresso nella valutazione della responsabilità del
personale sanitario, LEGISLAZ. PEN. June 5, 2017, 1, 9 (expressing three critical
remarks about the new legislative focus on accredited CPGs: first, because of the
risks of a “medicine of State”; second, because of the inner limits of CPGs on one
side and the peculiarities of the medical profession on the other; third, because the
primary aim of the 2017 Law is the implementation of risk-management systems
in order to decrease the expenditure of public resources: consequently, the relevant CPGs for the purposes of the 2017 Law are not those exclusively aimed at
the patient’s benefit, but those combining elements of cost-reduction too).
107. See Laura Anna Terrizzi, Linee guida e saperi scientifici “interferenti”:
la Cassazione continua a non applicare la legge Gelli-Bianco, 7 DIR. PEN. CONT.
93 (2018).
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informed consent. 108 However, both topics are strictly intertwined
since the lack of adequate and complete information for the patient
may give rise to a form of healthcare professional liability.
This gap has been filled by a subsequent legal provision, Law
219/2017. Its first article is indeed headed with “Informed Consent.” 109 This provision expresses the aim of the law, which is to
recognize and protect fundamental rights—in compliance with both
the Italian Constitution (in particular, arts. 2, 13, 32) and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (arts. 1, 2, 3)—such as
the right to life, health, dignity, and the right of self-determination,
in particular mandating that no healthcare treatment should be carried out without the free and informed consent of the involved person.
Before the enactment of this statutory recognition, the right to
informed consent lacked a specific legal framework, but Italian
judges used to ground it on the above-mentioned constitutional provisions. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court had highlighted the
function of informed consent as a synthesis of both the right to selfdetermination and the constitutional right to health, since both imply
the right to complete and adequate information. 110
The task to outline the content and boundaries of this right has
therefore been assigned to the Italian judges, who have developed a
remarkable case law. Their role is still important since the recent law
does not specifically address compensation of harm and does not
clarify other related issues. A recent Italian Supreme Court ruling, 111
108. A point of convergence between the 2017 Law and the topic of informed
consent, has been identified in the duty of the physician, willing to adopt a different approach to treat the patient than that recommended by the CPGs, to specifically reporting the reasons of her choice. Such decision, has been noted, shall be
explained to (and agreed upon with) the patient, both in order for the consent of
the latter being really effective and, at the same time, for ex ante, exculpatory
purposes, having in mind the potential adverse effect of such decision in a judicial
context. See Granelli, supra note 5, at nn. 54-56.
109. Legge Dec. 22, 2017, n. 219, in force since Jan. 31, 2018.
110. Corte Cost., sentenza Nov. 18, 2008, n. 438, available at https://perma
.cc/XN4A-WB2Z.
111. Cass., sez. III Civile, Dec. 22, 2017, n. 7248 [hereinafter Cass. n. 7248].
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issued the day of publication of the Law 219/2017, is worth mentioning. The Court expressly adhered to the settled judicial orientation according to which the absence of the informed consent of the
patient has autonomous dignity for purposes of damage-compensation. Consequently, the breach by the physician of the duty to secure
the informed consent of the patient might cause different kinds of
damage. Firstly, a damage to the patient’s health whenever she is
able to demonstrate that had she been duly informed, she would have
never undergone the surgery, thus avoiding its harmful consequences. Secondly, damage for breach of the right to self-determination, which occurs when, due to the lack of information, the patient suffers a pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage (in this case provided that the harm is substantially serious 112).
Indeed, in the opinion of the Court, thanks to adequate and complete information, the patient has:
− the right to choose among different options of medical
treatment;
− the power to require further and different medical
opinions;
− the power to choose a different institution and/or specialist;
− the right to refuse the surgery or the therapy and/or the
right to consciously interrupt it;
− the power to consciously prepare herself to the negative consequences of the surgeon wherever they result
particularly burdensome and painful, even because
completely unexpected for the patient due to the lack
of relevant information. 113
The scenery of the harmful events is thus quite articulated. In
particular, there might be:
(1) absent or unsatisfactory information about a surgery that has

112. Id. § 3. Ex plurimis Cass., sez. III Civile, July 5, 2017, n. 16503; Cass.,
sez. III Civile, Oct. 13, 2017, n. 24074; Cass., sez. III Civile, Nov. 27, 2015, n.
24220; and Cass., sez. III Civile, Feb. 13, 2015, n. 2854.
113. Cass. n. 7248, supra note 111, § 3. The same reasoning has been adopted
by the Supreme Court in a subsequent decision, Cass., sez. III Civile, ordinanza
Dec. 4, 2018, n. 31234.
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caused damage to the health of the patient due to the fault of the
physician in cases where the patient would have anyway undergone
the surgery: in these circumstances, the compensation will cover
only the damage to the health (pursuant to Supreme Court
901/2018);
(2) absent or unsatisfactory information about a surgery that has
caused damage to the health of the patient due to the fault of the
physician in a situation where, if duly informed, the patient would
have never undergone the surgery: in this case, the damage to be
compensated will be the damage to the health of the patient as well
as that due to the breach of the patient’s self-determination right;
(3) lack of information about a surgery that has caused damage to
the health of the patient not due to the fault of the physician, in cases
where the patient would have anyway undergone the surgery: in this
situation, the damage will cover the infringement to the patient’s
right to self-determination, while the harm to the patient’s health
shall be assessed on a case by case basis; and
(4) lack of information about a surgery duly performed and not causing any damages to the patient’s health: in this scenario, the infringement of the patient’s right to self-determination shall be compensated only if the patient has suffered the unexpected consequences
resulting from the surgery without the necessary consciousness and
being totally unprepared to them.
For compensation of the damage to the right of self-determination, the damage should meet or exceed the legal threshold of seriousness of the harm, as set forth by Supreme Court: Civil Joint Division no. 26972/2008 and 26975/2008. 114 Again, the ongoing dialogue between the legislative, judicial, doctrinal formants has made
it possible to ensure an appropriate legal framework to efficiently
protect selected and deserving interest.

114. These two cases are commonly known as “S. Martin’s twin-rulings” and
are dealing with the requirements and the criteria to compensate the non-pecuniary damage.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The topic of medical malpractice (rectius, healthcare liability) is
very complex and interesting, and it is a field where the “law in action” plays a fundamental role, even in light of the manifold, heterogeneous, and sometimes conflicting interests of different stakeholders. Within the Italian legal system, the relevant legal framework has been developed thanks to a constant and articulated dialogue among different formants. In a first period, such dialogue occurred in particular between the Italian Judges and the opinion of
jurists. Recently, the statutory formant has also been directly and
actively involved.
The analysis of the last six years reveals that this phenomenon
is still a work in progress that needs to be adjusted and better tailored
to the field. However, due to the peculiarities of medicine and
healthcare protection and their transnational nature, the dialogue
should occur not only among formants of the same legal system, but
also looking at the experiences of other legal systems, and applying
a critical comparative approach. Referring to the U.S. scenario, it
proves evident that many issues raised by the Italian legislative
choices have been analyzed there and investigated for some time,
both in their positive and negative aspects. In this regard, the paradigmatic example can be found in the debate surrounding the role
and the function of CPGs, which are the undeniable protagonists of
the attempt to cope with the new concept of medicine that seeks
more standardization and links to scientific evidence (although there
is no unanimous consensus at all about medicine being a science).
In addition, the U.S. debate has highlighted the need to cope with
the necessity to decrease healthcare costs, to enhance patients benefit, and with the struggle to find suitable legal rules.
However, a peculiar feature of the Italian legal system within
this area of law is that the judicial formant has constantly been very
active in developing and settling the legal framework, and in paying
specific attention to claim its autonomy in interpreting and applying
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the relevant norms, even when not properly in compliance with (or
clearly departing from) the legislative choices.
With specific reference to the topic of CPGs, the occurrence of
clear “solos” by the Italian judges in such musical score is undeniable. On the opposite side of the great theoretical emphasis placed by
the 2017 Law on the exculpatory role of CPGs, there is indeed the
systematic and constant distinction affirmed by the Italian judges
about the unsuitability of CPGs to act as a shield or as an automatic
waiver of liability on behalf of healthcare providers. 115
More generally, while the measures introduced by the 2017 Law
seem to have achieved positive results regarding civil litigation, the
same cannot be said about criminal litigation. This might provoke
adverse effects in light of the high level of uncertainty and unpredictability of medical malpractice claims, 116 thus discouraging the

115. See Mariotti, supra note 52, § 3: “guidelines are an abridgement of the
scientific, technological and methodological achievements concerning the specific operative fields, qualified in such way after an accurate selection and installation of different contributions, without any presumption of immobilism and
lacking any suitability to stand as binding rules.” About the role of CPGs, see also
the ruling of the Cass., sez. III Civile, ordinanza Nov. 30, 2018, n. 30998, affirming the absence of liability of both the physicians and the hospital for having administered to a patient with a hemorrhagic risk a lower dose (i.e., the half) of
heparin than the recommended one, in order to balance such risk with that of venous thrombosis. The departure from the recommendations set by the relevant
CPGs is justified, in the opinion of the Court, by the need to reach a compromise
between the two concurring risks. With specific regard to CPGs the court holds:
CPGs (i.e., the leges artis sufficiently shared at least by a distinguished
part of the scientific community in a given time) are not an insurmountable Procrustes’ bed . . . . They are only a parameter to assess the physician’s behavior: generally, a behavior in compliance with the CPGs will
be diligent, whilst a behavior not in compliance with the CPGs will be
negligent or imprudent. However, this does not mean that a behavior not
in compliance with the CPGs might not be deemed diligent if the specific
circumstances of the case dictate not to abide by such CPGs ( for example, when the CPGs require a particular medicine but the patient is allergic and thus the physician does not prescribe it); for the same reason even
a behavior in compliance with the CPGs might be deemed negligent on
the basis of the circumstances of the case (for example, when the CPGs
recommend a surgery and the physician abides by them although the patient’s previous conditions do not allow her to tolerate a total anesthesia).
116. See, e.g., D’Alessandro, supra note 50, at 277; Caputo, supra note 47, at
295; Alessandro De Santis, La colpa medica alla luce della legge Gelli-Bianco,
7-8 STUD. IUR. 790, 796-798 (2017); (all arguing about the risks of liability of the
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healthcare providers and negatively affecting the patients’ benefit.
This uncertainty is further enhanced by the judicial clash about the
proper interpretation of the 2017 Law, which the intervention of the
Criminal Joint Division of the Supreme Court did not unravel. In
this scenario the doctrinal formant seems called to find a balance
between the (sometimes problematic) text of the law and the judicial
interpretation. The conversation has just begun.

Italian State for breach of art. 7 of the ECHR due to a legislative framework not
suitable to guarantee the certain and predictable outcome of criminal trials).

